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1.  On 16 December 1965 the Bureau of the
European  Parliament  instructed the Econom.ic
and F inancial Committee to draw up a report on
the Community's future activities in the field of
monetary policy. At its meeting of. 25 November
1965 the Committee had already gone into this
question in the light of statements  by the EEC
Commission.  The Committee  appointed Mr. Dich-
gans its Rapporteur at a  meeting held on
11 January 1966.
Past actiaities of the European Parliament
9.  Parliament has stressed the importance of
monetary policy for European integration in a
number of reports and motions for resolutions.
In addition to older publications ('), the following
deserve special rnention :
(a)  Report drawn up by Mr. van Campen for
the Economie and Financial Committee on
the co-ordination  of monetary policies in
the EEC (Doe. 77 /1962-63)  ;
(b)  Report drawn up by Mr. Bousch for the
Economic  and Financial Committee on the
co-ordination of budgetary and financial
policies (Doc. 79/L962-63)  ;
(c)  Report drawn up by Mr. Vals for the Eco-
nomic and Financial Committee on co-
operation in monetary and finaneial mat-
ters in the European Community (Doc. tO3/
1963-64).
3.  Mr. van Campen's report shows how
important co-ordinating monetary policies is for
achieving the Treaty aims, and examines the
means by which monetary policies rnight be co-
ordinated both in the Community and in its
relations with non-member countries. The report
concludes that a federal organization of EEC
central banks should be set up under a centralized
body with a view to making a gradual transition
from co-ordinated national monetary policies to
an effective common  monetary policy. The Euro-
pean Parliament's resolution of. 77 October tg62
e,g. report by Mr. van Campen  (Doc. 54/1958-59)  and report
by Mr. Deist (Doc. 2311960-61).
glves the Executives a" policy mandate along
these lines (Annex I).
+.  The resolution  passed on the same day on
Mr. Bousch's  report dwells upon the interrelation-
ship existing between the various aspects of
economic  policy and upon the need to ensure
that they make parallel progress (Annex II).
5.  The last special report of the European Par-
liament on monetary policy-the Vals report-
sirnilarly stresses the need for closer and closer
co-operation in monetary and financial matters.
The report deals with the progress that might
be made at the institutional level, widening the
Monetary Committee's powers, setting up a
Committee of  Governors of  Central Banks,
consultation in the event of changes in parity.
The European Parliament  passed the resolution
adopting the Vals report (Annex III).
6.  Mention should also be made of the Euro-
pean Parliament's  reports on the EEC Commis-
sion's annual general reports. In Nos. 52 to 56 of
Mr. Charpentier's report on the Eighth General
Report on the activities of the EEC (Doc. 93/
1965-66) a position is taken up with regard to
questions of monetary policy. Parliament wel-
comes the Commission's efforts to render fluetua-
tions in the rate of exchange between EEC
countries impossible and, indeed,  unnecessary.
The Commission is asked to pay particular
attention to foreign investment in the six member
States. Parliament regrets that progress in
liberalizing capital movements has recently
slowed  down.
Growrng urgencA of m,onetary poli,cy tasks
7.  In  its  seventh annual report (Offi,cial,
Gazette No. 42 of 15 March 1965) the EEC's
Monetary  Committee notes that with the progress
made towards economic integration, inflationary
and deflationary  trends in  certain member
States are spreading  more and more rapidly to
other Community countries and disturbing their
economies. This growing danger of a rapid spread
of local disturbances calls for urgent counter-
measures in terms of eo-ordinated  monetary
policies.
The EEC's Monetary Committee rightly
observes that co-ordination measures are likewise
becoming more and more pressing in external
monetary policy relations. The transactions of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
recently been financed largely by the EEC
countries. Capital imports from non-member
countries are a further major problem of common
concern. The EEC Commission  reaches similarcondlusions in its Eighth General Report (Doc.
50/I-II of 1 June 1965).
Monetarg policy anil economic pol'ilcA
8.  Monetary  polioy cannot be treated separate'
ly from other aspects of economic policy. Every
monetary poliey measure  has repercussions  on
short-term economic policy. AII such measures
exercise an influence on external trade, and many
of them on structural or regional poliey. Only
within the framework of an overall economic
policy that weighs up the possible effects of
every conceivable kind of economic intervention
can it be decided which monetary poliey measures
are the most appropriate. The following observa-
tions are made on this subject in No. I  of
Mr. van Campen's  report :
' Monetary policy is characterized  more by
the instruments that are available to it
than by its ends. Broadly  speaking, it pur-
sues the same ends as economic policy as
a whole, although working towards some
more directly than others. It is its instru-
ments, however, that distinguish it  most
sharply from other branches of economic
policy. It  could be defined as one whose
economic policy instruments act directly
upon monetary aspects, particularly on the
volume of money, credit, foreign exchange
reserves and the rate of exchange.  This
head covers practically all the government's
powers-mostly  exercised in practice by the
finance minister-and  certain powers of
speeial institutions set up in a number of
countries to regulate  the capital and money
market.'
These observations remain  as valid as ever.
Progress at the institutional  leuel
g.  Considerable  progress has been made at the
institutional level :
(a)  Before any major decision affeeting inter-
national monetary relations is taken by
member States, the Monetary Committee
.  has to be consulted. The powers of this
committee have therefore been widened  ;
(b)  A Committee of Governors  of Central Banks
was set up and has held regular meetings
since 1964 '
(c)  The Budget Policy Committee has started
out on its wonk ;
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The Short-term Economic Poliey Committee
deals with monetary policy questions in the
course of its normal duties ;
The same applies to the Medium-term Eco-
nomic Policy Committee  ;
(f)  Member States have undertaken to consult
one another before any change is made in
their pars of exchange ;
(S) The panel of experts on capital markets
carries out the preparatory work for the
Commission in the field of monetary policy
integration ;
(h)  Recently th6 EEC Commission suggested
that the Council could reach agreement, at
least once a year and in the light of a
report by the Commission, on the monetary
policy to be pursued vis-h-vis  non-member
countries.
Some of these bodies have been in existence
for only a short while and a great deal of the
work is still in the initial stage. But the organiza-
tion as a whole appears at present to be complete
and adequate for the purpose, although this
obviously does not mean that working parties
or committees  of experts may not later have to
be set up to study other aspects of the matter
and to give' the Commission's departments a
helping hand.  r
Reuiew of the work ilone bA the instdtutdons
10. Of the work done by the Council, the EEC
Commission and the various courmittees, the fol-
lowing in particular  should be mentioned  :
(a)  On 15 April 1964 the Council, on a proposal
by the Commission, recommended  the intro-
duetion of a common and general program-
me for fighting inflation (1) ;
(b)  On 8 April 1965 the Council, on a proposal
by the Commission, again recommended
guidelines on short-term economic policy
that took monetary and financial policy
instruments  into account (2) ;
(c)  The Commission has submitted proposals
for harmonizing indirect taxes on aceu-
mulated capital  ;
(d)  The 'Commission is seeking to secure a,
better statistical basis for the study of
(1) See Oltictq.l Gaaette No. 64 of 22 Aprll 1964.
(3) See Ollielol Gazette No. 65 of 16 Aprll 1965.
(d)
(e)capital movements (Doc. 38/1966-67 ; see
also Baas report) ;
(e)  The Council has issued two guidelines on
the liberalization  of capital movements  (see
No. 26).
(f)  The Monetary Committee's  diseussions  have
helped to bring closer the views of member
States on the improvement  of the world
monetary system  ;
(g)  The recommendations  put forward. by the
Mortetary  Committee after studying the
position in the different countries, and by
the Short-term Economic Policy Committee
after studying the  economic budgets,
provide a suitable basis for co-ordinating
monetary  policies.
11. The perrnanent eontacts existing at various
levels between the political bodies and experts
of member States ean serve as a stepping-stone
to further progress. All concerned are in this
way hept informed of the situation and interests
of their partners. Mutual understanding fosters
a concerted approach both inside and outside the
Community. The system of contacts and ex-
changes of  information should therefore  be
extended.
From the results so far achieved in the
field of monetary  policy it can be clearly seen
that the longest stretch of the journey still lies
ahead. The Community can only succeed if it
progresses in every sector. As pointed out in
Mr. Vals'report  (Doc. 103/1963-64), unless paral-
lel progress is made in all sectors the entire
foundations of the Common Market will become
distorted.  The bases of a co-ordinated economic
policy of the member States have in many cases
yet to be created at national level. A co-ordinated
monetary  policy cannot be brought into existence
until budget and fiscal policies have been more
closely co-ordinated.  Only by using all the avail-
able instruments in combination can success be
achieved in the long run. European monetary
union can be used as the keystone but not as the
foundation of economic  unity.
EEC Commission  proposaZs
13. fn its Eighth General Report the EEC
Cornrnission  mentions four main directions  in
which it is seeking a solution  (No. 134)  :
(a)  Complete unification of the Community in
the matter of eapital movements,  whether
for long-term or short-term  investment ;
Increasing  harmonization of the instru-
ments of  monetary policy and greater
sotidarity between the rnember States in
the matter of their policy towards  non-
member countries :
Intensified co-ordination of economic and
financial policies to counteract economic
imbalances.
The Parliam,ent's  task
14. In Mr. Kreyssig's report on the EEC Com-
mission's Sixth General Report (Doc. 76/L963-64
of 8 October 1963, No. 415) attention is drawn
to the problems arising from the restricted scope
for supervision  available in the pariiamentary
sphere. The danger of ill-defined responsibilities
is evident. The European Parliament reiterates
the request already made in Mr. Vals'report  that
the EEC Commission and Parliament participate
in discussions at the various levels and study the
results together at regular intervals. Of course'
no country in the world plans changes in its
currency's parity in the course of parliamentary
debates. Parliament must however be able, in
times of crisis, to form and express an opinion
at short notice so that the executive bodies
concerned  can take its advice into account in
reaching their decisions. Whetever happens, the
existence of a large number of institutions must
not be allowed to create doubts as to the unity
of European  economic  policy. It is one of Parlia-
ment's major tasks to ensure this unity.
A federal monetu,rA  orga,nization i'n Europe
CI.s a long-term  obiectiue
75. The European Parliament  is fully alive to
the difficulties of co-ordinating monetary  policies.
It welcomes the EEC Commission's cautious ap-
proach which keeps within the terms of the
Treaty and takes existing structures into account.
Only gradually, step by step, can a common
monetary policy be brought into being. The final
goal has already been described in Mr. Vals'
report : a fed,eral organczation,  of central banks
of the EEC under a centrali'aed' bodyt q, cornrnon
monetary poli,cy.
First of all the obstacles  standing in the
way must be swept away one after the other. A11
mernber States today are experiencing  the same
difficulties. The pursuit of an identical end by a
number of different routes must not be allowed





Monetary problems  inside the Community
Th,e Comm.uni,ty's  monetary  policy
16. What steps can be taken in the near future
to advance the Community  along the road leading
to monetary union ? A study of the Monetary
Committee's report, of the EEC Commission's
Eighth General Report and, more espeeially, of
tle statements made by Vice-President  Marjolin
before the European Parliament on 23 March
1965, would suggest the following measures  :
Hannonization of fiscal, b,udget and short-
term economic policies must be such as to
establish in the Community a state of
balance which would. rule out the need for
internal changes in rates of exchange and
permit contractual consolidation of  the
rate ;
The fact that the rate of exchange in indi-
vidual EEC countries can be altered to an
appreciable extent (as iu the ease of deval-
uation or  upward revaluation) has a
braking effect on the integration process.
The Community must therefore outldw such
practices or make them impossible. In the
meantime, however, it would serve a useful
purpose if all settlements  within the EEC
could be carried out on entirely different
lines. fn fact, the existing clearing system,
which in no way differs from that applied
between the EEC and non-member coun-
tries, entails unnecessary  costs and formal-
ities and, owing to the authorized fluctu-
ations of rates of exchange  about parity, a
measure of uncertainity. These peculiarities
are hardly appropriate to a Community in
which payments should be effected as in a
unified monetary  area.
17. Results of the kind desired can only be
hoped for when co-operation is no longer confined
to the intervention of central banks but is
extended to budget policy, which is often more
important for progress in monetary  matters than
the policy of central banks. In this respect the
influence of budget policy on liquidity is of
particular  importance. The principles of a budget
policy geared to monetary  policy requirements
must still be examined in detail.
Integrati,on of capital markete
18. The Parliament has repeatedly  deplored the
inadequate progress made in creating a liberal-
ized European capital market.
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Liberalization  of the nftovement of goods
and services in the CommunitSt also depends  on
the free flow of capital. Uniform conditions  of
competition in a free market'can only be estab-
lished if all partners in a comparable position
enjoy the same access to eapital. The movement
of eapital among Community  countries must
therefore be freed.
Retorrn of nationnl  capdtal markets
19. AII Community eountries are today study-
ing ways and means oJ increasing  the availability
of capital and directing it to points where it
would be of the greatest economie utility. The
Commission must bring the various national
reforms into line with each other and with the
Community's objectives.
20. The continued existence  of restricted capital
markets and of an excess of demand.  over supply
remains the major source of com.mon concern.
This shortage of capital has not been without
tangible results  :
(a)  In some Community  countries the rate of
interest has climbed to levels previously
only experienced  in  overseas countries
where risks were high ;
(b)  The distribution of capital in some Com-
munity countries  is subject to tight control.
The treatment given varies from industry
to industry so that the conditions of com-
petition are distorted.
Interest rates
91.  Movements of money and capital acroes the
frontiers in a liberal, smoothly-running  economy
are the natural result of the pull exerted by areas
of  maximum productivity.  Such movements
should be encouraged rather than hindered.
Problems arise only when capital movements
are influeneed by political rather than economic
considerations.
29. In some European countries interest rates
on medium-and long-terrn credits have climbed
to I and even beyond 10 per cent. These are well
above those demanded for comparable loans in
the USA and Switzerland (where incidentally  the
trend is also upwards, though not to anything
Iike the sarme extent as in Europe). What is at
the root of these exeessively high interest rates
in Europe ?
(b)Cupital uccumulq,tlon
23. The disparity between supply and demand
on the capital market reflected in these exag-
geratedly high rates of interest is not, as might
be thought, the resr.rlt of inadequate capital accu-
mulation. Capital accumulation  in relation to the
gross national product is highly satisfactory in
the Community. fn the individual countries it
accounts for between 20 and 27 per cent of the
GNP, with the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Netherlands  in the lead. Capital accumulation
stands at more or less the same level in Swit-
zerland and a little lower (below 20 per cent ;
see Annex IV) in Great Britain and the USA.
Compartson wtth th.e USA and Swi,tzerl,and
2+. A comparison of the Community's eeonomic
strueture with that of the USA or Switzerland
does not disclose the econornic  causes of the
existing disparities in interest rates. To say that
in the United States a higher proportion of
capital is employed, and therefore  gives a lower
marginal yieid, does not account for these dif-
ferences in interest rates. Sinee eeonomic  and
financial policies are the same, interest rates in
all these countries should be more or less at the
same level. This opinion is shared by American
banking experts, who believe that the rate of
interest on capital would settle down to about
5 per cent in the Community if  inflationary
trends could be mastered and if excessive political
dernand on the capital market-whether direct or
through interest subsidies-could be brought
down to an economically  aeeeptable level.
Results of inflation
25. The main eause of excessively high interest
rates is the inflationary  trends that have set in
in a number of rnember States. If the saver has
to face an annual drop in the value of money of
4 per cent, he will be prepared to save only if he
receives a rate of interest that offsets such
depreciation. This pressure for higher interest
rates is all the more marked if the prospective
saver is fully aware of the existence of inflatio-
nary trends-still by no means always the case.
It  should also be remembered  that interest is
liable to income tax even where it merely offsets
a fall in the value of money. In the event of an
annual fall in value of 4 per cent with income
tax standing (in the top bracket) at 50 per cent,
interest at 8 per cent, which after tax leaves
the saver only 4 per cent, does nothing more
than compensate for the reduced value of the
capital which, in faet, is earning no interest.
26. Now a lender can only seeure a high inte-
rest rate if he can find a borrower prepared  to
pay it. The borrower, for his part, will only
entertain a high rate if he anticipates an infla-
tionary trend. Anyone who feels that the price
of a purchase made today will be 4 per cent
higher in a year's time, can tranquilly accept a
relatively high rate of interest and, in fact,
does so.
Steep interest rates have the following effects
on the international  capital market : inflation,
when attended by a risk of devaluation,  leads to
a flight of capital which cannot be checked even
by raising interest rates. But as long as there
is no imminent danger of devaluation,  high inte-
rest rates induced by inflationary  trends attraet
foreign capital which, in its turn, may accentuate
such trends. A capital influx of this kind can
only be resisted by ridding the interest rate of
inflationary elements through anti-inflationary
measures.
Poli,ticul pressures on the capital, market
2?. In addition to these inflationary factors,
excessive demand for capital in the publie sector
also tends to send up interest rates. This exces-
sive demand takes one of two forms :
(1)  loans floated by governments  and regional
and local authorities  :
(2)  loans in the private sector encouraged by
grants of interest subsidies from the State
(e.9. housing, agriculture).
Pubh,c loans
28. The loan policy pursued by the public au-
thorities differs widely from one Community
country to another. In some countries State
requirements of capital, and dernands from the
private sector which the State considers  worth
encouraging,  are met at interest rates which the
States keeps at a low level by denying access
to the capital market to other would-be borrow-
ers. Such a course is particularly  easy to follow
in countries where the banking system is in the
hands of the State.
29. The proportion of capital absorbed by the
public sector traditionally varies from country
to country. It  differs widely in countries such
as Franee and Italy where the capital market is
controlled by the State. In the Federal Republie
of Germany it has ranged in recent years betweenComparable  figures for other Community
countries are not available.
3+. If  interest subsidies in Europe send up
interest rates from 5 to 8 per cent, this means
that a special charge of 3 per cent is being borne
by other capital users-this in addition to the
direct burden borne by the State in the form of
interest subsidies. The proceeds of this special
charge flow not to the State but to the saver to
whom this additional income must be conceded.
In the production sector, however, excessive inte-
rest rates send costs higher and higher. In this
w&V, excessive demand for capital induced by
State intervention exercises an additional infla-
tionary influence
35, Interest subsidies, which in many cases
date back over a long period, have become an
accepted and established fact and cannot there-
fore be abolished overnight. A basic decision
must, however, be taken, and this should be on
the following lines :
In the long run anyone engaging in econo-
mie activity ought to meet the actual cost of the
goods or services  he demands.
36. Now there will always be citizens whose
incomes are too low to permit them to satisfy
their wants at the prevailing cost price' In such
cases the modern State must obviously extend
a helping hand. Fellow-citizens must be assured
of a decent standard of living even if they are
incapable of achieving this through their own
efforts.
This problem should, however, be tackled
only in terms of specific cases and' not by over-
all cuts in prices. The Community's interest sub-
sidies are leading to a system whose consequences
cannot be foreseen and which in individual cases
is manifestly unjust.
37. In so far as economic  poticy requires inter-
vention  (see No. 31), interest subsidies should
only be resorted to when capital is in ample sup-
ply and if the rise in demand resulting from such
subsidies will not drive interest rates above the
normal international  level.
Where, on the other hand, an interest  sub-
sidy would ruin the capital market, the overall
damage would exceed its specific utility. Loans
out of public funds would then be preferable,
even if they entailed a rise in taxes.
Anti-cy clical capit al market policg
38. The State ought therefore to pursue an
anti-cyclical  capital market policy. In the event
of a boom in interest rates, it should keep clear
of the capital market as far as possible, even if
this forces it to increase taxes. On the other hand,
if the supply of capital is excessive, it  should
step in as a borrower. If, in previous years, it has
granted. loans out of current revenue, in years
of low interest rates it can equally well cover
current expenditure by borrowing, and in this
way offset earlier lending operations on the
capital market.
Increase in the suPPlY of caPital
39. If economic  poliey is to create and maintain
a capital market operating at reasonable  interest
rates on a par rvith those of other major indus-
trial countries, it must protect the capital mar-
ket from excessive poliey-related  pressures.  In
addition it must seek out ways and means of
achieving the highest possible voiunne of savings,
and of bringing savings,  which are mostly of a
short-term  nature, into line rvith the require-
ments of long-term capital investment. At the
same time, the special features of individual
member States and areas must not be lost
sight of.
The route covered by savings capital from
saver to borrower is sometirnes costly and in-
volved. Any reform should take into account the
need to give srnall and medium-sized  industry
easier access to outside capital.
The Europea,n  ca,Pttal market
+0. Only a large capital market can satisfy the
needs of a large economic  market.
The size of European undertakings must be
increased to enable them to withstand competi-
tion from non-member countries. For this, capital
is needed. Increasing competition, and the resul-
ting fall in prices and rise in costs, have ever-
where narrowed the scope for financing out of
internal resources.  In the long run only a capital
market that is at once larger and rnore efficient
than national markets can accumulate the funds
needed to finance investment by major enter-
prises.
+1. A large capital market is just as neeessary
ior s"ue"s as for borrowers. Providers of capital
would have more scope for pLaeing their funds,
with more evenly spread risks, and those seeking
capital would be assured of far ampler supplies'
The Econornie and Financial Committee there-
fore supports the EEC Commission's aim of
cornplete integration of capital markets in the
Community.{:i
-  r1*-Ei  -l .t ';:it -i'! 
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-. ;i-.tl  + 4Cupital uccumulati,on
23. The disparity between supply and demand
on the capital market reflected in these exag-
geratedly high rates of interest is not, as might
be thought, the result of inadequate capital accu-
mulation. Capital accurnulation  in relation to the
gross national product is highiy satisf,actory in
the Community. In the individual countries it
accounts for between 20 and 27 per cent of the
GNP, with the Federal Republic of Germany  and
the Netherlands  in the lead. Capital aecumulation
stands at more or less the same level in Swit-
zerland and a little lower (below 20 per cent ;
see Annex IV) in Great Britain and the USA.
Compari,son  wr,th the USA and Swi,tzerlanil
2+. A comparison of the Comrnunity's  economic
structure with that of the USA or Switzerland
does not disclose the economic causes of the
existing disparities in interest rates. To say that
in the United States & higher proportion of
capital is employed, and therefore gives a lower
marginal yieid, does not aecount for these dif-
ferences in interest rates. Since economie  and
financial policies are the same, interest rates in
all these countries should be more or less at the
same level. This opinion is shared by American
banking experts, who believe that the rate of
interest on capital would settle down to about
5 per cent in the Community if  inflationary
trends could be mastered and if excessive political
demand on the capital market-whether direct or
through interest subsidies-could be brought
down to an econornically  acceptable level.
Results ol inflatr,on
2,5. The main cause of exeessively  high interest
rates is the inflationary trends that have set in
in a number of member States. If the saver has
to face an annual drop in the value of money of
4 per cent, he will be prepared to save only if he
receives a rate of interest that offsets sueh
depreciation. This pressure for higher interest
rates is all the more rnarked if the prospective
saver is fully aware of the existence of inflatio-
nary trends-still by no means always the case.
It  should also be remembered  that interest is
liable to ineome tax even where it merely offsets
a fall in the value of money. In the event of ar^
annual fall in value of 4 per cent with income
tax standing (in the top bracket) at 50 per cent,
interest at 8 per cent, which after tax leaves
the saver only 4 per cent, does nothing more
than compensate for the reduced. value of the
capital which, in fact, is earning no interest.
96. Now a lender can only secure a high inte-
rest rate if he can find a borrower  prepared to
pay it. The borrower, for his part, will only
entertain a high rate if he anticipates an infla-
tionary trend. Anyone who feels that the price
of a purchase made today will be 4 per cent
higher in a year's time, can tranquilly accept a
relatively high rate of interest and, in fact,
does so.
Steep interest rates have the following effects
on the international  capital market : inflation,
when attended by a risk of devaluation,  leads to
a flight of capital which cannot be checked  even
by raising interest rates. But as iong as there
is no imminent  danger of devaluation,  high inte-
rest rates induced by inflationary  trends attract
foreign capital whieh, in its turn, may accentuate
such trends. A capital influx of this kind can
only be resisted by ridding the interest rate of
inflationary elernents through anti-inflationary
measures.
Poli,tical pressures on the capttal market
27. In addition to these inflationary factors,
excessive  demand for capital in the public sector
also tends to send up interest rates. This exces-
sive demand takes one of two forms :
(1)  loans floated by governments  and regional
and loeal authorities  :
(2)  loans in the private sector encouraged by
grants of interest subsidies from the State
(e.g. housing, agriculture).
Publtc loans
28.  The loan policy pursued by the public au-
thorities differs widely from one Community
country to another. In some countries  State
requirements of capital, and demands from the
private sector which the State considers  worth
encouraging,  are met at interest rates which the
States keeps at a low level by denying  access
to the capital market to other would-be borrow-
ers. Such a course is particularly  easy to follow
in countries where the banking system is in the
hands of the State.
29.  The proportion of capital absorbed by the
public sector traditionally varies from country
to country. It  differs widely in countries  such
as F rance and Italy where the capital market is
controlled by the State. In the Federal Republic
of Germany it has ranged in recent years between;:
':i4,..'  :  .i  4fComparable  figures for other Community
eountries  are not available.
3+. If  interest subsidies in Europe send up
interest rates from 5 to 8 per cent, this means
that a special charge of 3 per cent is being borne
by other capital users-this in addition to the
direct burden borne by the State in the form of
interest subsidies. The proceeds of this special
charge flow not to the State but to the saver to
whom this additional income must be conceded.
In the production sector, however, excessive inte-
rest rates send costs higher and higher. In this
woy, excessive demand for capital induced by
State intervention exercises an additional infla-
tionary influence
35. Interest subsidies, which in many cases
date back over a long period, have become an
accepted and established fact and cannot there-
fore be abolished overnight. A basic decision
must, however, be taken, and this should be on
the following lines :
In the long run anyone engaging in econo-
mic activity ought to meet the actual cost of the
goods or services  he demands.
36. Now there witl always be citizens whose
incomes are too low to permit them to satisfy
their wants at the prevailing cost price' In such
cases the modern State rnust obviously extend
a helping hand. Fellow-citizens must be assured
of a decent standard of living even if they are
incapable of achieving this through their own
efforts.
This problem should, however, be tackled
only in terms of specific cases and' not by over-
all cuts in prices. The Community's interest sub-
sidies are leading to a system whose consequences
cannot be foreseen and which in individual cases
is manifestly unjust.
3?. In so far as economic  policy requires inter-
vention  (see No. 31), interest subsidies should
only be resorted to when capital is in ample sup-
ply and if the rise in demand resulting from such
subsidies will not drive interest rates above the
normal international  level.
Where, on the other hand, an interest sub-
sidy would ruin the capital market, the overall
damage would exceed its specific utility. Loans
out of public funds would then be preferable,
even if they entailed a rise in taxes.
Anti- cy ch,cal capital market policg
38. The State ought therefore to pursue an
anti-0yclical  capital rnarket policy. In the event
of a boom in interest rates, it should keep ciear
of the eapital market as far as possible, even if
this forces it to increase taxes. On the other hand,
if the supply of capital is excessive, it  should
step in as a borrower. If, in previous years, it has
granted loans out of current revenue, in years
of low interest rates it can equally well cover
current expenditure  b3r borrowing, and in this
way offset earlier lending operations on the
capital market.
Increase in the supplY of caPital
39. If economic  policy is to create and maintain
a capital market operating at reasonable  interest
rates on a par with those of other major indus-
trial countries, it must protect the capital mar-
ket from excessive policy-related  pressures.  h:
addition it must seek out ways and means of
achieving the highest possible volume of savings,
and of bringing savings,  which are rnostly of a
short-term  nature, into line with the require-
ments of long-term capital investment. At the
same tirne, the special features of individua-
member States and areas must not be lost
sight of.
The route covered by savings capital frorn
saver to borrower is sometimes  costly and in-
volved. Any reform should take into account the
need to give srnall and medium-sized  industry
easier access to outside capital.
Th,e Euroqean  caPttal market
+0. Only a large capital market can satisfy the
needs of a large economic  market.
The size of European undertakings must be
increased to enable them to withstand competi-
tion from non-mernber  countries. For this, capital
is needed. Increasing cornpetition,  and the resul-
ting fall in prices and rise in costs, have ever-
where narrowed the scope for financing out of
internal resources.  In the long run only a capital
market that is at once larger and rnore efficient
than national markets can accumulate the funds
needed to finance investment by major enter-
prises.
+1. A large capital market is just as necessary
io" *"u""s as for borrowers. Providers of capital
would have more scope for ptr'aeing their funds,
with more evenly spread risks, and those seeking
capital would be assured of far ampler supplies'
The Economic and Financial Committee there-
fore supports the EEC Commission's aim of
complete integration of capital markets in the
Community.l!.' rl 
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